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I. Introduction
Recent evidence suggests that national borders have a large deterring effect on the shipment of goods. Contrary to the popular belief of global integration and a borderless world, firms sell much more to domestic clients than to otherwise identical foreign customers. John McCallum (1995) , for example, finds that trade between Canadian provinces exceeds comparable trade flows between
Canadian provinces and US states by factor 20.
Following this striking finding, there are basically two sorts of studies. 1 A first wave of papers aims to provide additional estimates on the size of the border effect. Since Statistics Canada initially appeared to be the only national statistical office in the world that reports intra-national trade data and thereby allows to estimate the border effect directly, these studies began by exploring various extensions of McCallum's original framework (Anderson and Smith [1999] , Helliwell [1998] ). Later, Shang-Jin Wei (1996) proposed ingenious ways to approximate the missing data so that it was also possible to estimate the home bias for other countries (Head and Mayer [2000] , Nitsch [2000a] ).
Finally, it turned out that intra-national trade data are also available for some more countries.
A second line of research seeks to explain the surprisingly high estimates of the border effect. An interesting empirical contribution is Holger Wolf's (2000) finding that also regions within countries are not fully integrated; while there are no visible barriers to trade, trade within US states is disproportionately large. Most of this work, however, focuses on methodological aspects. James Anderson and Eric van Wincoop (2001a) , for instance, show that the border effect is reduced if a theoretically grounded gravity equation is estimated. Carolyn Evans (2001) argues that about onehalf of the estimated border effect is due to the fact that fewer goods are available as exports.
This paper explores another unique data set of intra-national trade flows. In particular, I examine data on trade between West German Bundesländer (federal states) and East Germany which are available as a relic of German division. Instead of attempting to propose another explanation of why borders matter, however, these results are meant to provide the basis for a discussion of possible implications for border regions.
To preview the main results, I find a home bias of about factor 2.2, although the data cover only a small fraction of intra-German trade flows. While national borders clearly inhibit trade, it is argued that this does not necessarily imply a negative outlook for the economic development of border regions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents the results.
Section 4 discusses some implications for border regions, and section 5 concludes.
II. Methodology and Data 2
Methodology
The standard tool to assess the impact of national borders on trade is the gravity model. This simple framework is empirically highly successful in explaining the volume of trade between two geographical areas (usually countries) by the economic size of these areas and the distance between them:
(1)
where X ij are exports from unit i to unit j, Y i and Y j are the GDP of i and j, respectively, and D denotes the distance. 3 This basic specification can then be augmented by other variables which are assumed to affect bilateral trade flows. Other studies, for example, typically find statistically significant coefficients on dummies for country pairs that speak a common language (LANG) or share a common border (ADJA). 4 Moreover, it has been argued (Deardorff [1997] ) that the relative position of a country matters, with countries that are far away from other markets (and therefore face less alternative trade opportunities) trading more with each other. Most notably for our purposes, however, extending the sample to cover also trade flows between domestic locations allows to include a HOME dummy which measures the extent to which intra-national trade possibly deviates from external trade. The benchmark specification to be estimated is then given by 2 The following two sections draw heavily on Nitsch (2000c) . 3 There is (now) firm theoretical foundation for this regression specification. For instance, models based on CES preferences and goods that are differentiated by region of origin typically yield (a variant of) the following equation:
, where t are iceberg costs of trade, P denotes the consumer price index and σ is the elasticity of substitution (see, for instance, Anderson and van Wincoop [2001a] where HOME takes the value of one for intra-national trade and zero otherwise, and R is the measure of remoteness which is, following Nitsch (2000a) , defined as
Data
It is one of the contributions of this paper to apply this fairly standard regression framework to a new set of intra-national trade data. Another contribution of this paper is the application of finely disaggregated distance data. Recent attempts to approximate the average distance for internal shipments has shown that the standard procedure in gravity models of using the simple distance between particular city pairs (e.g., the two largest cities) can yield seriously distorted results; a problem that appears to be most acute for neighbor territories with a wide variety of potential cross-border trading distances. A natural solution
to this problem appears to be the calculation of average weighted distances for a large sample of cities, as proposed by John Helliwell and Geneviève Verdier (2001) . Therefore, I compute the average weighted (great circle) distance between all cities with a population larger than 20,000 for intra-German trade flows, while the average distance for external trade is approximated by the weighted distance between the federal states' cities with a population above 20,000 and the five largest cities in the foreign country. An appendix reports the distances used in the analysis (see also Nitsch [2000b] ).
The data sources can be summarized as follows. Intra-German trade data are taken from Statistisches Bundesamt (1995) . Comparable external trade data by Bundesland and by country are compiled from detailed machine tables, also supplied by the Statistisches Bundesamt. Finally, all other country specific data such as GDP and population are obtained from the European
Commission (1996), with Bundesland GDP data approximated by using weights from detailed regional accounts (VGRdL [1998] ).
Different Concepts of Home Bias
Before I present the results, it is necessary to discuss some qualifications. A first obvious observation is that a simple regression analysis of trade flows from a West German state to East Germany relative to the state's exports to other countries captures only a fraction of the German home bias. For one thing, the analysis ignores intra-state shipments. Fortunately, this problem appears to be of minor importance. Also McCallum's (1995) and Helliwell's (1996) original studies on Canada consider only inter-provincial trade flows. More importantly, however, the analysis also misses, due to the lack of data, deliveries between West German states. In effect, the data set covers only a very specific part of intra-German trade flows so that the results should be interpreted as a lower-bound estimate of the average German home bias.
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A second concern is that trade flows between West and East Germany could possibly be distorted.
For at least 30 years, trade between the two halves of Germany was artificially suppressed until the political barrier was suddenly lifted in 1990, and it remains unclear how trade has responded to the redrawing of the national border. On the one hand, trade may have fallen since the reunification has removed the basis for the large part of the few existing intra-German trade relations. The fall of the Berlin wall has also opened up trade opportunities with other Western countries, while a recession in East Germany after the introduction of the Deutschmark may have suppressed trade in general. On the other hand, trade may also have strongly increased, benefitting from the temporal increase in demand associated with the radical switch of the East German economy to a market system and the renewal of the East German infrastructure (mostly financed by government transfers).
While the German case indeed might be too special to draw from it any general conclusions about the impact of national borders on trade, it should be noted that the empirical analysis is based on data for the period from 1992 to 1994, when major adjustments of intra-German trade flows may have been completed. Figure 2 shows that, after a sevenfold increase from 1989 to 1992, West
German shipments to the East German Länder were relatively stagnant at about 65 bn. DM, limiting the risk of distorted trade data.
III. Results
Basic Specification
In a first step, I examine West German shipments to East Germany in relation to West German Given that the analysis covers only a fraction of intra-German trade flows, this estimate is quite remarkable. Second, contrary to standard results in gravity regressions, the coefficient on the importer's GDP is not statistically different from zero. Usually, this coefficient is strongly positive so that a rise in the importer's GDP is associated with a rise in exports. As the largest importer in the sample is the Netherlands (with a GDP about 50% larger than that of East Germany and Austria), this result suggests that the export volume to the Netherlands is disproportionately low. Hence, the German home bias is probably even larger than indicated by the home dummy.
Sensitivity Analysis
To explore the robustness of my results, I have performed a large number of sensitivity analyses. For instance, although standard, the use of (real) GDP as a measure of economic size might be inappropriate in the present case since a large share of East Germany's GDP was provided by fiscal transfers from West Germany. 9 To deal with this issue, I use the log of population size as an instrument for the log of GDP. 10 Given that per capita income in East Germany is considerably below that of alternative shipment destinations in the sample, I would expect that this modification yields a lower estimate of the border effect. The first column in table 2 presents the results. As shown, the estimated coefficient on the home dummy indeed drops to 0.37 but the coefficient remains statistically highly significant and economically large; West Germany shipments to East Germany are disproportionately large. The other estimated coefficients are basically unchanged.
In a next step, I add a few explanatory variables which are usually found to affect international trade flows. Specifically, I apply the same sample as before to estimate variants of equation (2) on the income variables should be one. This modification, however, has almost no effect on the results; imposing unitary coefficients leaves the estimated home bias basically unchanged.
In another robustness check, I increase the number of export destinations to deal with the problem of possible misspecification due to the small number of importers. Anderson and Smith (1999) already expand McCallum's original Canada-US data set to cover also Canadian trade with 11 other international trading partners and find surprisingly little variation in the estimated border effects. How then does an extension of our sample affect the results?
Column (1) of table 3 presents the results for a sample of seven German neighbor countries. 11 The increase in the number of observation indeed improves the efficiency of the estimation. The estimated coefficient on the importer's GDP, for instance, becomes statistically significant and is of reasonable magnitude. Also, the coefficients on the adjacency and (German) language dummies become significantly different from zero, meaning that there is larger-than-proportional trade between statecountry pairs that share a common border or speak the same language. The coefficient on the additionally included dummy on membership in the European Union (EU) is insignificant. Turning to the key variable of interest, the estimated border effect remains largely unchanged. With this extension, the German home bias is about 2.4.
11 The countries are Austria, Belgium & Luxembourg, Czechoslovakia (the Czech Republic for 1993-4), Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.
Columns (2) and (3) exclude re-exports and East Germany also has access to the sea, this finding might in part result from the cities' port activities.
Unreported results show that differences in import volumes indeed help to explain differences in the estimated home bias between West German states; states with a large share of imports in GDP also report disproportionately large shipments to East Germany. Controlling for this effect, however, does not weaken the key results. The estimated home bias for a state with an average import share is basically unchanged at 2.2, implying that the previous estimates are not distorted by a few West
German states operating as hubs for East Germany's imports from the world.
IV. Implications for Border Regions
What do all these results (and others in the literature on border effects) mean for border regions? In the following, I will put these empirical findings into context and discuss some general implications for border regions. 12 The sample includes Austria, Belgium & Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands,
Borders Matter
A first observation is that national borders indeed have a measurable inhibiting effect on trade. The estimation results for Germany have shown that West German deliveries to East Germany exceed comparable border-crossing deliveries to an otherwise identical foreign country by a factor of about 2.2. Moreover, this result is probably only a lower-bound estimate. The data cover only a small fraction of intra-German shipments and apply to a period shortly after unification.
There is also no evidence that this finding suffers from misspecification. Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) argue that most estimates suffer from omitted variables bias and theoretically inconsistent parameters. However, adding remoteness measures and imposing unitary income elasticities has little effect on the German results. Also Keith Head and Thierry Mayer's (2001) critique that many border effect estimates are probably inflated by the use of inappropriate distance data does not apply here.
The results are derived from a comparison of direct shipments between regions, with no assumptions for intra-regional trade (and distances).
This implies, however, that border regions may indeed appear to be particularly disadvantaged. If policies, institutions and regulations that separate nations create large barriers to trade, then border regions, offering only limited access to markets due to their geographic location, may indeed be less attractive for firms and workers.
Trade Patterns Adjust Quickly
This does not mean, however, that border regions necessarily have depressing growth prospects.
For one thing, the evolution of intra-German trade flows shows that trade patterns are very responsive to changes in border barriers. After German unification, west German shipments to East Germany increased by factor 7 within three years.
Also other studies have shown that economic integration can very substantially increase international trade. Head and Mayer (2000) and Nitsch (2000a) , for example, find a gradual decline in the home bias in the European Union. Helliwell (1998, pp. 21-23) Helliwell (1998, p. 27) , for example, notes for Canadian provinces that the ranking of border effects basically follows the ranking in terms of resource dependence and, thus, is mainly determined by the industry mix of the province.
V. Conclusions
This paper explores a new data set on intra-national trade flows. In particular, data on trade volumes between West German Länder and East Germany, available as a relic of Germany's former division, allow to estimate the East Germany bias in West German goods trade. Although the data cover only a small fraction of intra-German shipments, I find that West German deliveries to East Germany exceed comparable border-crossing deliveries to an otherwise identical foreign country by factor 2.5. In a second part, I then discuss the implications of large border effects for border regions. I argue that there is no support for the hypothesis that border regions are necessarily disadvantaged. 
